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Let me start with a confession: I am a formalist, at least to a 
certain extent, and a pragmatist, at least when it comes to 
treaty conflicts in international law – which is why Surabhi’s 
book „Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts and the Politics 
of International Law” was not an easy read for me. This 
assessment, however, reveals more about myself and how I 
(would) approach the topic than it does about Surabhi’s 
analysis, which I find intellectually provocative and very 
thoughtful. It is a tremendously important book that will not 
only change how we analyze and conceptualize treaty 
conflicts from now on, but that also provides an important 

contribution to the fundamental debate on what 
international law is and how it works.
Readers looking for practical answers to the question of how 
to solve strategically created treaty conflicts will be 
disappointed, given that the book does not offer ready-made 
concepts – and that for very good and simple reason: such 
easy answers do not exist. Instead of taking the 
constructivist path (in other words, conceptualizing the 
underlying legal problem and proposing potential solutions 
to different categories of strategically created treaty 
conflicts, as I would have done it), the book focuses on what 
the phenomenon of strategically created treaty conflicts can 
tell us about international law in relation to international 
politics, and thus in relation to power. It is this broader 
objective pursued in her book that I will address first.
The main question that drives the book’s analysis – does 
(international) law constrain politics, especially those of 
powerful actors, or is it contingent on (state) power and 
interest – has haunted lawyers, and not just international 
ones, for decades, even centuries. The formalist approach to 
law has always been influential in these debates, given that it 
offers an almost irresistible promise: that law is impartial, 
impersonal and consistent in its application, that it provides 
continuity and allows individuals to align their behavior with 
what the law requires. It seems to me that this take on law is 
particularly powerful in times in which law, in relation to 
political and economic power, has relatively little 
importance. In such circumstances, law’s promise of a better 
and just world becomes increasingly appealing. Adding to 
that, a formalist concept also provides the tools for 
achieving this just and better world by juridifying all 
personal, political and economic interactions. In other 
words, a formalist approach to law is also an idealistic one. 
But since idealism has difficulty prevailing in the ‘real world,’ 
law, in practice, has to fall short of the formalist approach’s 
promises. In consequence, those who believed in the 
promises of law become disillusioned, while those who never 
did seized their chance to advance their explanations on 
how law works and its relationship to power and politics, 
which they usually describe as being more realistic.
This (admittedly simplified) account of the great tidal waves 
of how we conceptualize (international) law and its 
relationship to politics and power is, I think, important so as 
to locate Surabhi’s analysis within the larger context of how 
international law has developed since the 1990s, and when 
and where it has since then fallen short of its promises. The 
preceding Cold War was an ideal period during which the 
formalist approach to international law could develop its 
promising potential. For its adherents, it offered a 
convincing alternative to the prevailing realist or neo-realist 
schools of international relations. When the Cold War 
ended, it seemed only logical that international law would 
now finally unfold its full potential: to bring about world 
peace through law. That promise, however, did not 
materialize. Even though international law increasingly 
gained importance, at least as a means of communication, it 
was also increasingly used to achieve specific political ends. 
This disappointment is, I think, reflected in Surabhi’s book, 
seeing as she positions herself between Jack Goldsmith and 
Eric Posner’s neo-realist approach to law, which they try to 
substantiate by borrowing some very basis concepts from 
game theory, on the one hand, and David Kennedy’s 
intellectual reckoning with “mainstream legal scholars” and 
his disillusioned account of international law as “lawfare”, 
and thus as an “allsorts discourse”, on the other hand.
While I understand the disillusion with international law, one 
that I have felt as well, I found Surabhi’s categorization of the 
existing literature – formalist, functionalist, and 
constructivist mainstream versus neo-realists and those 
committed to the idea of law as discourse – could appear too 
schematic. It is my impression that most formalists are 
aware of the limits inherent to their approach. The same 
holds true for most constructivists, given that any 
explanations or theories about the nature of international 
law and its workings cannot be separated from the specific 
historical contexts in which they were developed, in other 
words, they are always contingent on time and 
circumstances. If that is so, then all these approaches are, to 
a certain extent, valid – which in turn raises what could 
perhaps be a question for future debate, namely what each 
approach, whether formalist, functionalist, constructivist, 
neo-realists or “discoursivist” (for lack of a better term) can 
contribute to the problem of strategically created treaty 
conflicts. Is it possible to combine these different 
approaches or are they mutually exclusive? And, ultimately, 
how are such conflicts dealt with from a legal perspective? I 
am well aware that it was not the aim of Surabhi’s analysis to 
answer the last question. But as I confessed at the beginning: 
I am a formalist and a pragmatist. In other words: I am 
interested in theory, but I am also interested in how these 
different theoretical approaches play out in solving legal 
problems.
While reading the book, I also had the impression that 
despite Surabhi’s rejection of the formalist account, some 
formalist assumptions are nevertheless discernable in her 
analysis, namely the distinction between law-making and 
interpretation. Most strategically created treaty conflicts are 
not conflicts in the narrow sense, i.e., situations in which 
treaty A prohibits the same conduct that treaty B requires. 
Rather, most treaty conflicts can be categorized as either 
policy or potential conflicts, seeing as whether or not a 
conflict arises depends on the case at hand and therefore on 
the conduct of the states involved. With regard to these 
categories of treaty conflict scholars proposed different 
conflict-prevention methods, especially reconciling the 
relevant treaties or treaty regimes. It is this urge for 
reconciliation that, I think, motivated Surabhi to develop a 
radically different perspective on strategically created treaty 
conflicts, one that focuses on their underlying political 
dynamics. As she writes:
“[I]n many cases, attempts at reconciling 
treaties may in effect substantially limit or 
alter one of the treaties, bypassing formal 
procedures for its amendments. Indeed, that 
may be their very purpose. Such cases make 
it evident that legal doctrine’s emphasis on 
reconciliation allows strategic creation of 
treaty conflicts to be a productive endeavor; 
for to create a new, conflicting, treaty is to 
create a new starting point for 
reconciliation” (p. 11).
I agree with this argument, which also highlights how 
important it is for legal scholars to always consider what 
consequences the methods that they advance to solve a legal 
problem may carry. At the same time, I wonder: Doesn’t the 
assumption that treaties are altered or limited through 
strategically created treaty conflicts reflect the formalist 
hypothesis that it is always possible to distinguish between 
changing a treaty and interpreting it because we can always 
determine the interpretative limits of a specific treaty 
regime? I should say that although I declared myself a 
formalist, I am skeptical that we can make a clear, 
unambiguous distinction between changing and interpreting 
a treaty. It thus seems equally plausible to conceptualize 
strategically created treaty conflicts as a struggle over the 
precise meaning of a legal provision. And even though this 
struggle is regularly driven by political considerations, at 
least in cases of strategically created treaty conflicts, I have 
my doubts whether this actually reveals that international 
law is either simply epiphenomenal to or a mode of politics. 
If we look at debates among lawyers, we can observe that in 
absence of an authoritative decision, these can be fierce, 
personal and diverse. Based on this observation, strategically 
created treaty conflicts do not necessarily illustrate how 
political influence destroys the otherwise orderly 
functioning of law, but rather exemplify that the struggle 
over the meaning of law is part of law itself. They illustrate 
the ambiguities of law and the political compromises that 
made the creation of law possible, which therefore, and 
unavoidably so, are reflected in a treaty or a specific legal 
provision.
Surabhi’s inspiring and important book challenged me to 
rethink much of what I thought I knew about treaty conflicts 
in particular and international law in general. The few ideas 
that I have sketched out above should therefore be 
understood not as criticism, but as a reflection of my own 
struggles with the topic in light of Surabhi’s thorough, 
complex and rich analysis. My only aim was to contribute 
questions to what I think is and will continue to be a very 
important debate.
Jasper Finke is Associate Professor for Public Law, Public 
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